| Sagsnummer: | 712/2023 |
| Dato: | 19-08-2024 |
| Ankenævn: | Henrik Waaben, Kritte Sand Nielsen, Nanna Vetter Viberg Nielsen, Rolf Høymann Olsen og Poul Erik Jensen. |
| Klageemne: | Betalingstjenester - øvrige spørgsmål Betalingstjenester - fjernsalgstransaktioner |
| Ledetekst: | Krav om tilbageførsel af kortbetalinger til firmaer, som skulle investeres via et andet firma. Indsigelse om svindel. |
| Indklagede: | Danske Bank |
| Øvrige oplysninger: | |
| Senere dom: | |
| Pengeinstitutter |
Indledning
Sagen vedrører krav om tilbageførsel af kortbetalinger til firmaer, som skulle investeres via et andet firma.
Sagens omstændigheder
Klageren var kunde i Danske Bank, hvor han havde en konto med et tilknyttet MasterCard Direct.
I perioden fra den 19. oktober 2022 til den 2. januar 2023 foretog klageren 14 betalinger med sit MasterCard Direct, herunder seks betalinger på i alt 10.550 EUR og otte betalinger på i alt 65.590 DKK, svarende til i alt 144.070,69 DKK, til to kryptobørser, K1 og K2, en betalingstjenesteudbyder, B, og et pengeinstitut, P:
|
Dato |
Beløb i EUR |
Beløb i DKK |
Modtager |
|
19.10.2022 |
|
13.090 |
B |
|
21.10.2022 |
|
19.000 |
B |
|
05.12.2022 |
|
11.000 |
B |
|
05.12.2022 |
|
18.500 |
B |
|
06.12.2022 |
|
500 |
B |
|
09.12.2022 |
100 |
|
K1 |
|
10.12.2022 |
2.900 |
|
K1 |
|
11.12.2022 |
|
1.000 |
P |
|
11.12.2022 |
|
2.000 |
P |
|
13.12.2022 |
3.500 |
|
K1 |
|
14.12.2022 |
500 |
|
K1 |
|
16.12.2022 |
|
500 |
P |
|
27.12.2022 |
3500 |
|
K2 |
|
02.01.2023 |
50 |
|
K2 |
Banken har oplyst, at kortbetalingerne blev autoriseret af klageren, og at betalingerne er korrekt registreret og bogført.
Ved e-mail af 30. maj 2023 sendte klageren et engelsksproget brev til banken, hvori han gjorde indsigelse mod betalingerne. Af brevet fremgår blandt andet:
”…
In October 2022, I engaged with the crypto investment company [V] under the belief that they offered legitimate investment services. However, it became evident that their operations were involved in illegal and fraudulent activities. The company deliberately designed, developed, manufactured, promoted, marketed, distributed, labeled, and sold deceptive investment services with the sole intention of defrauding clients through a cycle of fabricated gains and losses.
Initially, I experienced what appeared to be substantial profits on their trading platform. However, when I attempted to withdraw these profits, I was unexpectedly requested to pay a substantial tax. It was at this point that I realized I had fallen victim to a scam.
To facilitate the fraudulent scheme, payments were made from my Danske Bank account to various intermediaries such as Wise, Revolut, Coinbase, and Binance. These intermediaries converted the funds into cryptocurrency and transferred them to the scammer's wallets through coercion and false pretenses. The trading platform itself was rigged to display the deposits I made and the supposed profits, which ultimately proved to be nonexistent. The purpose of the website was to deceive and defraud unsuspecting individuals, aiming to extract as much money as possible.
In total, an amount of 144,070.69 DNK [DKK] was illicitly transferred from my account as a result of this elaborate scam utilizing your services.
…
MERCHANT’S FRAUD SCHEME — ALLEGATIONS
The Company hired, managed, and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to their crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include, but are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and malicious activities:
1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating from various unassociated locations across the globe.
2. The Company opened bank accounts in multiple countries and used them through their accomplices and strawmen from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated through legitimate sources.
3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation and falsified its agent names, credentials, competencies, qualifications, and location. The Company’s name is merely a brand name, officially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being conducted from elsewhere (the supposed location is evidently fictitious), and furthermore, the call center, marketing, and decision-making are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden entities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum of financial maneuvers, is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.
4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a license and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require registration to operate.
5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g., “according to Bloomberg TV/Investing.com”)
6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data (e.g.: the manufacture of false charts). The trading platform was purposely manipulated, in a way that each client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the existence of the trades was fabricated. Instead, the Company’s staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money, using it to purchase various luxurious, non-essential items.
7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.
8. The Company was guaranteeing unrealistic returns/yields.
9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.
10. My money was not held in a segregated account.
11. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data representing the percentage of total client losses at the company.
12. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.
13. The Company did not read me the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).
14. The Company used high-pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my health.
15. Armed with my personal details, the Company’s staff seduced me, until I transferred all my savings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square and honorable business dealings along with honesty, to maliciously take advantage of my trusting nature.
Please take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses.
Attached, please find supportive statements, screenshots, and further evidence.
EXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATION’S MISCONDUCT
I hereby allege that your organization has breached the duty of care that is owed by a financial institution to its clients in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the sole purpose of a payment instruction is to defraud the client. Under such circumstances, you are obliged to refrain from executing the payment instruction until you have been able to conclude that there is a legitimate basis for the instruction.
The duty of care requires financial institutions to take reasonable care and skill when executing the instructions of a client. It is recognized as authoritative by leading academic texts [1]. The duty arises in cases where it can be argued that an ordinary prudent staff member of a financial institution would have “a reasonable basis for suspicion that a particular payment instruction would result in the misappropriation of the funds of the client."
When the duty does arise, it can be discharged simply by “refraining from executing the instruction unless and until such time as the financial institution is able to establish that the instruction relates to a lawful obligation.” The financial institution should seek further information and/or documentation from the client in order to help establish this.
Based on the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it has become glaringly obvious to me that at best, no adequate information and/or documentation were sought by your organization, and at worst, no appropriate safeguards were implemented.
If a financial institution executed a customer’s order to transfer money knowing it to be “dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable individual would make," it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment instruction is made in accordance with the terms of the mandate and the bank is liable for negligence resulting in damages.
Compliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and that where there are suspicions, these suspicions must be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.
For the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on and suspended transactions until reasonable inquiries could be made to verify that the transactions were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable banker would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I am a fraud victim. (Singularis Holdings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [2019] UKSC 50 [2].
A financial institution would never be as reckless with its own assets as has been the case with my assets, and if you had treated my assets as though they were your own, this would not have been made possible. The debits made from my account should be reversed as a result of your failure to take proactive measures to protect it, just as you would do if your own assets were in a similar state of peril. It is also libelous/defamatory to make false statements about an individual that adversely affects their credit rating.
When discussing the responsibilities that a bank might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of a client might generate/give rise to a further statutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a bank to a regulator are distinct from those beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be liable to more than one regulator.
…”
Ved e-mail af 19. juni 2023 sendte klageren endnu et engelsksproget brev til banken, hvori han blandt andet anførte, at han havde været udsat for en såkaldt ”authorized push payment scam” i forbindelse med betalingerne og:
”…
You ought to have analyzed and distinguished thereafter between what may be normal activity and that which might suggest an illegal enterprise. This is an ethical standard of industry practice that plays a substantial role in preventing criminals from liquidating and laundering the public's funds.
With today’s technology and the vast intelligence network of the banking industry, I strongly believe that all banks would have a list of blacklisted companies or those merchants that are involved in fraudulent businesses, and would thus have alerted your customers against being made victims of fraud when such transactions were made.
…
I maintain that Danske Bank completely failed to adequately investigate the circumstances surrounding the transactions in question and willfully blinded itself to obvious red flags in relation to what was happening to the account. It is of significant concern that, compared to the usual activity taking place in the account, [Danske] Bank did not notice a scam taking place, making me lose my savings.
…”
Banken afviste klagerens indsigelse med henvisning til, at han selv havde autoriseret betalingerne, og at de pågældende ydelser blev leveret i betalingslovens forstand.
Banken har oplyst, at den har lavet et opslag på det engelske finanstilsyns hjemmeside (FCA), og at hverken V, K1, K2, B eller P er registreret som ”klon” virksomhed.
Parternes påstande
Den 16. november 2023 har klageren indbragt sagen for Ankenævnet med påstand om, at Danske Bank skal betale 144.070,69 DKK til ham. Ankenævnet skal desuden undersøge, hvorvidt hans tab kunne være undgået, hvis Danske Bank havde implementeret tilstrækkelige sikkerhedsprocedurer.
Danske Bank har nedlagt påstand om frifindelse, subsidiært afvisning.
Parternes argumenter
Klageren har blandt andet anført, at banken skal kompensere ham for hans tab i forbindelse med betalingerne, som han foretog under falske forudsætninger og under tvang fra et svindelfirma, V.
Han indgik en aftale med V i den tro, at V var en reel udbyder af investeringsservices, hvilket viste sig ikke at være tilfældet. V’s handelsplatform var sat op på en sådan måde, så den viste de penge, som han indskød og hans angivelige fortjeneste, som dog viste sig at være ikke-eksisterende. Formålet med V’s hjemmeside var at svindle og bedrage intetanende personer.
Banken udviste ikke rettidig omhu, da den lod betalingerne gå igennem. Havde banken advaret ham om de potentielle risici forbundet med hans betalinger, ville han ikke have fortsat, hvorved han kunne have undgået et betydeligt tab.
Banken må have haft kendskab til, hvad der skete, eller må være blevet advaret om den reelle risiko for, at han var ved at blive svindlet. Banken vidste eller burde således have vidst, at han handlede med en svindler.
Banken burde have taget rimelige foranstaltninger for at afværge svindel eller i det mindste have mindsket risikoen for svindel ved at have anvendt et effektivt risikostyringssystem.
Banken foretog ikke en ordentlig undersøgelse af sagen. Banken tog aldrig hensyn til, at han var en sårbar kunde, der blev udsat for økonomisk svindel og derved mistede alle sine midler.
Han er meget skuffet og føler sig snydt, da banken undlod at handle umiddelbart efter hans indsigelse mod betalingerne.
Banken overholdt ikke Payment Services Directive (II) (EU) 2015/2366.
Banken overholdt ikke hvidvaskloven.
Danske Bank har til støtte for frifindelsespåstanden anført, at sagen handler om, hvorvidt klageren har fået leveret den ydelse, han havde indgået aftale med V om, og at klagen skal vurderes med afsæt i betalingslovens § 112, stk. 1, nr. 2.
Klageren indgik selv aftale med V og indvilligede i at gennemføre betalingerne til K1, K2, B og P med sit betalingskort. Betalingerne gik således ind på konti hos K1, K2, B og P efter klagerens ønske. Hverken V, K1, K2, B eller P er registreret som ”klon” virksomheder på det engelske finanstilsyns hjemmeside.
Alle betalingerne blev autoriseret af klageren og gennemført med hans samtykke.
Betalingerne blev brugt til at købe kryptovaluta hos K2 mv., som blev leveret. Der er derfor ikke tale om, at der ikke er sket levering efter betalingslovens § 112, stk. 1, nr. 2.
Banken har løftet bevisbyrden for, at der er sket levering, og er derfor berettiget til at debitere klagerens konto i banken.
Banken er ikke ansvarlig for klagerens brug af de overførte midler eller købte kryptovaluta. Banken er heller ikke ansvarlig for, at klageren blev skuffet i sine forventninger til investeringerne, eller at V ikke levede op til den aftale, klageren indgik med V om investering af hans midler, herunder hans kryptovaluta.
Banken er heller ikke ansvarlig for en efterfølgende uenighed mellem aftaleparterne.
Banken har i øvrigt ikke handlet ansvarspådragende.
Klageren henviser til flere bestemmelser i hvidvaskloven, som pålægger banken forpligtelser, som banken har over for myndighederne, og som relaterer sig til risikoen for hvidvask og terrorfinansiering. I nærværende sag er der ikke tale om, at der er mistanke eller rimelig grund til at formode, at en transaktion, midler eller en aktivitet i banken har eller har haft tilknytning til hvidvask eller finansiering af terrorisme. Hvidvasklovens bestemmelser finder således ikke anvendelse i nærværende sag.
Til støtte for afvisningspåstanden har banken anført, at det kun vil være muligt at træffe afgørelse i sagen, hvis klageren og eventuelle vidner under strafansvar afgiver mundtlige forklaringer. Ankenævnet bør derfor afvise sagen under henvisning til § 5, stk. 3, nr. 4, i Ankenævnets vedtægter.
Ankenævnets bemærkninger
Klageren var kunde i Danske Bank, hvor han havde en konto med et tilknyttet MasterCard Direct.
I perioden fra den 19. oktober 2022 til den 2. januar 2023 foretog klageren 14 betalinger med sit MasterCard Direct på i alt 144.070,69 DKK, til to kryptobørser, K1 og K2, en betalingstjenesteudbyder, B, og et pengeinstitut, P.
Klageren har oplyst, at han indgik en aftale med virksomheden V, der fremstod som en reel udbyder af investeringsservices. Via sin adgang til V’s handelsplatform kunne han følge med i udviklingen af sine investeringer og kunne se en betydelig fortjeneste. Da han forsøgte at få fortjenesten udbetalt, blev han pludselig opkrævet en høj skattemæssig afgift, og han opdagede herved, at der var tale om investeringssvindel.
De i sagen omhandlede kortbetalinger blev foretaget med klagerens medvirken og samtykke, hvilket klageren ikke har bestridt. Betalingslovens § 100 om uautoriserede betalinger finder derfor ikke anvendelse.
Ankenævnet finder, at det må lægges til grund, at K1, K2, B og P leverede den aftalte ydelse, og at midlerne af klageren blev overført til V. Ankenævnet finder på den baggrund ikke, at banken i medfør af betalingslovens § 112 om manglende levering er forpligtet til at opfylde klagerens krav om tilbageførsel af kortbetalingerne.
Ankenævnet finder ikke, at der er oplyst omstændigheder, der kan medføre, at banken på andet grundlag er forpligtet til at godtgøre klageren det påståede beløb.
Spørgsmål om bankens implementering af sikkerhedsprocedurer falder uden for Ankenævnets kompetence.
Klageren får herefter ikke medhold i klagen.
Ankenævnets afgørelse
Klageren får ikke medhold i klagen.