Krav om erstatning i forbindelse med tvangslukning af WTI Crude Oil May 2020 Futures kontrakter i en situation, hvor handelsprisen blev negativ. Indsigelse om, at det ikke var muligt at afgive ordrer med henblik på at lukke position.
| Sagsnummer: | 178/2020 |
| Dato: | 11-05-2021 |
| Ankenævn: | Vibeke Rønne, Jesper Claus Christensen, Jimmy Bak, Mor-ten Bruun Pedersen, Anna Marie Schou Ringive. |
| Klageemne: |
Værdipapirer - køb, salg, rådgivning
Værdipapirer - øvrige spørgsmål |
| Ledetekst: | Krav om erstatning i forbindelse med tvangslukning af WTI Crude Oil May 2020 Futures kontrakter i en situation, hvor handelsprisen blev negativ. Indsigelse om, at det ikke var muligt at afgive ordrer med henblik på at lukke position. |
| Indklagede: | Saxo Bank |
| Øvrige oplysninger: | |
| Senere dom: | |
| Pengeinstitutter |
Indledning
Sagen vedrører krav om erstatning i forbindelse med tvangslukning af WTI Crude Oil May 2020 Futures kontrakter i en situation, hvor handelsprisen blev negativ. Indsigelse om, at det ikke var muligt at afgive ordrer med henblik på at lukke position, når handelsprisen var negativ.
Sagens omstændigheder
Klageren, der bor i Rumænien, blev kunde i Saxo Bank i oktober 2013. Banken har oplyst, at kundeforholdet (ID nr. -62) ophørte den 18. september 2019, at klageren den 1. oktober 2019 fik en ny konto i banken (kunde ID nr. -43), og at han i den forbindelse accepterede de pr. 25. september 2019 gældende Almindelige forretningsbetingelser af 3. januar 2018. Klageren har anført, at bankens Almindelige forretningsbetingelser af 3. januar 2018 ikke er gældende for ham.
Banken har fremlagt en ”sign up data Report” af 25. september 2019, der fremtræder som tiltrådt elektronisk af kunde ID nr. -043, hvori det bl.a. var anført:
”… Your acceptance as outlined below to: Saxo Bank's General Business Terms, the risk disclosure statement on complex products, … Please note that these can be amended periodically . …
I declare by my acceptance of these terms and conditions:
… To understand and accept that the General Business Terms (including the Risk Disclosure Statement) … (as amended from time to time) apply to my entire trading relationship with Saxo Bank; …”
Banken har oplyst, at “risk disclosure statement on complex products” var et link til afsnittet “Complex Products Risk Warning” på bankens hjemmeside, som indeholdt følgende:
“Below is an overall description of the characteristics of certain complex products and their markets and of the risks associated with these products. Further information is available on the last pages of the General Business Terms of Saxo Bank A/S and on www.saxobank.com under the section Education.
Trading in financial products always involves a risk. As a general rule, you should therefore only trade in financial products if you understand the products and the risks associated with them.
…
Futures
…
Futures trading involves speculating on the price of a specific underlying asset going up or down in the future. A future gives the holder a standardized obligation to either buy or sell the underlying asset at a specified price at a certain date in the future. The underlying asset may, for instance, be raw materials, agricultural produce or financial products. Depending on the nature of the future, the asset either has to be settled for the price difference or by actual delivery at the settlement date. Futures are always traded on margin (see "Foreign exchange trading" above). Futures are always traded in a regulated market, either by direct trading in the stock exchanges' trading systems, or by reporting of transactions.
As futures are margin traded, allowing you to take a larger position than you would otherwise be able to based on your funds with Saxo Bank, a relatively small negative or positive market movement can have a significant effect on your investment. Futures trading therefore involves a relatively high degree of risk. This makes the potential gain quite high, even if the deposit is relatively small. If your total exposure on margin trades exceeds your deposit, you risk losing more than your deposit.
…”
Banken har oplyst, at klageren oprindeligt var klassificeret som detailkunde. Den 19. marts 2020 anmodede klageren om at blive klassificeret som professionel kunde. I den forbindelse sendte klageren dokumentation til banken om, at værdien af hans portefølje oversteg 500.000 EUR, og at han havde minimum et års erfaring gennem ansættelse i den finansielle sektor i en stilling, der krævede kendskab til relevante finansielle produkter. Den 16. april 2020 blev klageren klassificeret som professionel kunde.
Klageren har fremlagt uddrag fra bankens hjemmeside vedrørende professionelle kunder, hvoraf det bl.a. fremgår:
”… Industry-wide regulations have been introduced and are designed to protect less experienced traders. However, if you’d like to waive these protections and trade with greater flexibility, you can apply for elective professional status.
Please read the following information carefully and note the protections you’ll waive as a professional.
Protections you’ll keep
…
- We must take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible results for clients when executing orders or when placing orders with, or transmitting to, a third party …
Protections you’ll waive
- Leverage restrictions applicable to retail clients do not apply to professionals. But remember, with increased leverage comes increased risk
- You will not have negative balance protection. Should your account fall into a negative balance, you will be obliged to make additional payments – meaning losses can exceed deposits
- As you understand the risks associated with trading complex financial products, we will not impose product restrictions upon you
- We may not provide you with any standardised risk warnings as you already understand the associated risks
- …”
Banken har fremlagt en oversigt over klagerens udførte handler via banken i perioden fra 1. oktober 2019 til den 16. juni 2020.
Klageren har fremlagt uddrag fra bankens hjemmeside vedrørende bankens kundeservice, hvoraf det fremgik, at ”a team of experts is on the call 24/5 to assist with technical and account questions”.
I e-mail af 17. april 2020 til klageren anførte banken vedrørende handel med oliefutures:
”… Also an article from 1st of April what explains the situation.
https://www.home.saxo/content/articles/commodities/bottom-picking-oil-prices-is-a-dangerous-business-01042020 Today’s price action in CLK0 clearly highlights the current risks in the oil market.
…
Today’s price action in CLK0 clearly highlights the current risks in the oil market.
CLK0 is trading down 9% ahead of Tuesday’s expiry as storage begin to fill and no one wants to take delivery of unwanted barrels.
The next month CLM0, currently at $25.50/b is a risk of being sold once it becomes the new front month.
AGAIN WE CANNOT REITERATE ENOUGH HOW DIFFICULT (DANGEROUS) IT CAN BE TO TRY TO BOTTOM FISH “CHEAP” OIL WHEN THE FUNDAMENTALS ARE THIS POOR.
…
None of the information contained herein constitute an offer to purchase or sell a financial instrument, or to make any investments. Saxo Bank A/S does not take into account your personal investment objectives or financial situation and makes no representation and assumes no liability to the accuracy or completeness of the information nor for any loss arising from any investment based on a recommendation, forecast or other information supplied from any employee of Saxo Bank A/S, third party, or otherwise. All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice. Any opinions made may be personal to the author and may not reflect the opinions of Saxo Bank A/S. Please refer to Saxo Bank A/S's full General Disclaimer http://www.saxobank.com/?id=193 "
Banken har fremlagt et print af artiklen, som e-mailen indeholdt et link til.
Den 20. april 2020 kl. 14:38 GMT købte klageren NYMEX WTI Crude Oil May 2020 Futures kontrakter (CLK0).
Den 20. april 2020 kl 16:48 GMT offentliggjorde CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange) en meddelelse gennem Bloomberg Terminal News om, at prisen på ”WTI futures May” kunne blive negativ. Den 20. april 2020 kl. 17:02 GMT sendte CME en mail til markedsdeltagerne om, at prisen på visse ”May 2020 Energy products”, herunder CLK0 ingen limit havde og kunne blive negativ.
Banken har oplyst, at prisen på CLK0 blev negativ den 20. april 2020 omkring kl. 18:08 GMT. Banken har fremlagt oversigter og diagrammer over prisudviklingen for CLK0 den 20. april 2020 for perioden fra kl. 18:00 GMT til kl. 19:59 GMT og i perioden fra januar 2020 til 21. april 2020.
Klageren har anført, at han forgæves forsøgte at logge på bankens handelsplatform for at lukke sine positioner, men at dette ikke var muligt som følge af fejl i bankens system. Banken har bestridt dette. Banken har fremlagt en aktivitetslog og en udvidet ”extended feature tracking” log for klageren og har anført, at det fremgår heraf, at klageren loggede på platformen den 20. april 2020 kl. 17:51 GMT, at klageren loggede af platformen den 20. april 2020 kl. 17:58 GMT, og at han atter loggede på kl, 18:52 GMT.
Banken har oplyst, at klageren ringede til banken den 20. april 2020 kl. 19:13 GMT, 19:14 GMT, 19:16 GMT, 19:28 GMT, 19:29 GMT and 19:35 GMT, men at klageren afbrød forbindelsen, inden han var nået igennem til banken.
Den 20. april 2020 kl. 19:30 GMT iværksatte klageren to overførsler på henholdsvis 20.000 EUR og 60.000 USD fra sin EUR konto og sin USD konto i banken. Banken har oplyst, at klageren som følge heraf ikke havde tiltrækkelig margin, og at han derefter blev stoppet ud. Overførslen på 20.000 EUR blev efterfølgende tilbageført med valør den 21. april 2020. Banken har anført, at tilbageførslen af de 20.000 EUR var begrundet i, at overførslen blev automatisk afvist ved clearing i SEPA, og at der ikke var angivet en landekode i overførselsanmodningen. Klageren har bestridt dette, og har anført, at han havde udfyldt de fornødne oplysninger. Klageren har til støtte herfor fremlagt print af bankens it-system, hvori det er anført, at overførslen var ”completed by Backoffice”. Klageren har anført, at banken uberettiget tilbageførte beløbet og brugte det til modregning i tabet vedrørende CLK0. Banken har bestridt dette. Af en kontoopgørelse for klagerens EUR konto fremgår, at saldoen efter tilbageførslen var 24.822 EUR, og at saldoen den 30. april og den 3. august 2020 var henholdsvis 24.820 EUR og 24.783 EUR. Af en kontoopgørelse for klagerens USD konto i banken fremgår, at saldoen efter overførslen på 60.000 USD var -25.060 USD, at der den 21. april indgik 30.124 USD med posteringsteksten ”Shares in FAZ:arcx”, og at saldoen derefter var 5.064 USD.
Den 20. april 2020 kl. 19:57 GMT blev klagerens position i CLK0 tvangslukket af banken til en pris på ÷32,75 USD. Klageren har oplyst, at hans tab på CLK0 var 32.750 USD.
Klageren har fremlagt udskrift af en telefonsamtale med banken den 20. april 2020, hvoraf det fremgik:
“Trader at 0:42 -So now I it closed automatically because nobody answered And I'm losing 40.000. Which is not normal.
Bank Agent at 0:50 - OK, look, I hear that.
I don't dispute any of that.
We had to obviously we had some issues with the system and the price became negative. And then the dealing desk was very busy. So it was possible that you were in a queue unable to get through.”
Klageren gjorde efterfølgende indsigelse over for banken vedrørende forløbet.
I e-mails af 21. april 2020 kl. 11:56 og 17.01 til banken rejste klageren krav om erstatning og anførte:
”… As we spoke on the phone, yesterday mid-day I have operated a buying order on WTI which was executed.
Due to the last night crisis, the price went down and I wanted to close it. This was not possible because:
-the platform did not execute the selling order as the trading for this instrument was blocked;
-I called the dealing desk several times (more than 7 times) to try to close it manual but there was no answer.
-I sent an email to support and still no answer on assisting me with this instrument.
-I tried to use the customer support option from the platform and it was blocked (I have video on this)
After i tried this for more than an hour and a half, I finally received a call from trading desk, asking me if I want to close the position, but unfortunately the position closed by itself before the call, but during my desperate calls to reach you. I need to mention that the agent, once confronted explained me "that they were busy" in dealing this.
Because of all the above, even though I had a position order of 10k, due to the fact that technologically and operationally Saxo did not work, I could not close the order when it was around 1 $ and It closed automatically when the position was on a big minus as price and lost 40k.
A fair treatment, due to your errors would be to:
- reinstated the position
- or execute the close order at 0”
“I have phoned your company from 2 of my numbers … more than 12 times.
- I have called you between 21:15 and 22:45
- I uploaded a part screen from my phone as of yesterday, plus 2 videos where customer support doesn’t work on the platform, plus you have an email sent to me to customer support where no reply.
I don’t want to drag it long:
- either you will reinstate and close to position on 0.
- OR let me make an official complaint and take it further.
Please also check your recorded line, how one of the dealing desk agents, confirmed that he "they were busy in dealing and did not have time to answer all calls"”
I e-mail (fremlagt i udateret udgave) til klageren svarede banken:
”This unprecedented, extraordinary market event resulted in unforeseen issues across the marketplace, at market participants, with our counterparts, as well as within Saxo Bank, there were issues with price streams, order placement and delay in filling orders externally. No one could reasonably be expected to prepare for the eventuality, but should be held up against due care in the actions taken during the event to mitigate risks.
Following events, and having verified that all open market risk has been managed with our clients, we have been in the process of a reviewing of all stop outs, executions, rejections, etc. This is a cumbersome process, due to the extreme volatility and low liquidity in the front month oil contracts, where several exchange circuit breakers where hit, which also resulted in a number of rejection in placing orders at our counterpart level (a market condition and not a Saxo Bank related limitation). It is not just looking at the price evolution, it is about determining a benchmark for realistic execution both price and liquidity wise, and it is about rerunning history to determine alternative outcomes, and finally, it is about evaluating client intent versus actual outcome.
Legally Saxo Bank is not liable for any loss, expense, cost or liability suffered or incurred by the Client due to a system or transmission failure or delays or similar technical errors unless Saxo Bank has exercised gross negligence in connection herewith. Furthermore, no instruction or order from a Client is binding on Saxo Bank until it has been accepted. No binding Contract or other transaction is entered into until it has been recorded as executed by Saxo Bank and confirmed by Saxo Bank to the Client through the Settlement/Trade Confirmation. Finally, in the event that the Client believes to have placed an instruction or order, but the Client has not received a Settlement/Trade Confirmation, the Client must contact Saxo Bank immediately. In the absence of such immediate notice from the Client, the order, transaction or Contract may at Saxo Bank’s sole discretion be deemed non-existent even if received by Saxo Bank.
We always want to treat our clients fairly and equally, and have offered commercial compensations in cases where we found it fair to do so, though Saxo Bank does not accept any fault or liability in this specific event. But having reviewed your complaint in depth, we have concluded that we cannot substantiate any direct loss from not being able to place a reducing order, and/or had those orders then been routed to the market and participated in the disorderly markets thereafter, the best case scenario would not have resulted in any improvement of the end result.”
Den 21. april 2020 kl. 18:30 GMT udløb CLK0 til en ”final settlement price” på 10,01 USD.
Klageren har fremlagt print med oplysning om en anden WTI future (CLQ0).
Af bankens Almindelige forretningsbetingelser af 3. januar 2018 fremgik bl.a.:
”… 2.1 The Client acknowledges, recognises and understands that:
i. Margin Positions are highly speculative, may involve an extreme degree of risk, and are appropriate only for persons who accept risk of loss in excess of their Collateral with Saxo Bank;
ii. because of the low level of Collateral often required in Margin Positions, changes in the price of the underlying Instrument may result in significant losses, which may substantially exceed the Client's investment and Collateral with Saxo Bank;
iii. when the Client instructs or requests Saxo Bank to enter into any Contract or purchase any Instrument, any profit or loss on such Contract or Instrument will be entirely for the Client's own account and risk;
iv. unless it is otherwise specifically agreed, Saxo Bank shall not conduct any continuous monitoring of the transactions entered into by the Client neither automatically nor manually. Hence, Saxo Bank cannot be held responsible for transactions developing differently from what the Client might have expected and/or to the disadvantage of the Client;
v. any investments include risks, and the Client has received no assurance otherwise and no guarantees of profit or similar representations from Saxo Bank, any entity of the Saxo Bank Group, any Introducing Broker, or representatives hereof.
…
10.1 The Client understands and accepts that in order to secure the identity of the transferor/Client, Saxo Bank only allows transfers of funds to and from the Client’s Account(s) to and from the Client’s own account(s) in other banks. This entails that Saxo Bank must receive sufficient information about the transfer from the transferring bank to ensure the identification of the relevant Client and relevant Account on which the funds shall be booked. Therefore, the Client understands and accepts that Saxo Bank is only able to place and book any transferred funds, if Saxo Bank is able to properly identify the Client and the Account on which the funds shall be booked.
…
10.5 The Client understands and accepts that the Client must always supply Saxo Bank with complete and correct payment details when providing payment instructions, including IBAN number and BIC code where relevant. When providing payment instructions the Client shall use the form available on Saxo Bank's website www.home.saxo. In the absence of the said information, Saxo Bank is not liable for the completion of the transfer, nor for any delays or extra costs arising from the absence of e.g. the IBAN number and/or BIC code.
…
10.15 The Client understands and accepts that Saxo Bank executes payments as SEPA payments if the following criteria are met:
i. The receiving bank must be a financial institution located within the EU or the EEA.
ii. The recipient’s account number must be indicated in the form of an IBAN number.
iii. The receiving bank must be indicated in the form of a BIC code.
iv. The receiving bank must have adopted the “SEPA Credit Transfer Scheme”.
…
26.1 Saxo Bank's general Margin Requirement for different types of Margin Positions appear from the Commissions, Charges & Margin Schedule available on Saxo Bank's website, www.home.saxo, as amended from time to time, and may be supplied to the Client on demand. However, Saxo Bank reserves the right to determine specific Margin Requirement for individual Margin Positions and Clients.
26.2 The Client is specifically made aware that the Margin Requirement is subject to change without notice. When a Margin Position has been opened, Saxo Bank is not allowed to close the Margin Position at its discretion, but only at the Client's instruction or according to Saxo Bank's rights under these Terms. However, Saxo Bank may increase the Margin Requirement if Saxo Bank at its sole discretion considers that its risk on a Margin Position or in respect of the Client has increased as compared to the risk on the date of the opening of the Margin Position.
26.3 The Margin Requirement applies from opening a Margin Position and throughout the term of the Margin Position. It is the Client's responsibility to continuously ensure that sufficient Collateral is available on the Account at any time to meet the Margin Requirement. Saxo Bank may, but is not required to, notify the Client if the Margin Requirement is not met (margin call).
26.4 The Client shall at all times comply with the Margin Requirement and shall pay to Saxo Bank on demand:
i. Such sums of money as may from time to time be due to Saxo Bank under an order or Contract;
ii. Such sums of money as Saxo Bank may from time to time require as Collateral in accordance with the Margin Requirement; and
iii. Any amount to maintain a positive cash-balance on any and all Account(s).
…
26.8 If the Client fails at any time to have provided sufficient Collateral to meet the Margin Requirement, other deposits or other sums due under these Terms, Saxo Bank may close any and all Contracts and Margin Positions upon notice to the Client and apply any proceeds thereof towards the payment of any amounts owed by the Client to Saxo Bank. Saxo Bank may in its discretion close all or some of the Client's Contracts and Margin Positions. Saxo Bank can use this right to close Contracts and Margin Positions even if the Client takes steps to reduce the size of open Contracts or Margin Positions or to transfer sufficient funds to Saxo Bank without assuming any liability towards the Client.
…
26.10 If the Client's combined exposure in one or more Margin Positions reaches a level which, in case of an adverse market development, may in Saxo Bank’s opinion lead to a significant deficit not covered by the Client's Collateral, Saxo Bank may, in its sole discretion (i) increase the Margin Requirement
and/or (ii) reduce the Client's exposure by closing or reducing one or more or all of the Client's open Margin Positions.
26.11 Furthermore, Saxo Bank is entitled, in its sole discretion, to determine that an emergency or an Exceptional Market Condition exists. In addition to any other rights Saxo Bank may have under these Terms, Saxo Bank may among others (i) increase the Margin Requirement, (ii) reduce the Client's exposure, (iii) close or reduce any or all of the Client's open Margin Positions and/or (iv) suspend trading.
…
28.2 Saxo Bank has the right to set off any amounts of the Client held by Saxo Bank against any amounts owed by the Client to Saxo Bank.
…
31.3 Saxo Bank shall not be liable for any losses resulting from:
i. Operational failures preventing the use of the Trading Platform;
ii. Interruptions preventing the Client from accessing the Trading Platform;
iii. Use of the Internet as a means of communication and transport; or
iv. Damage caused by matters relating to the Client's own computer systems.
…
31.6 Saxo Bank shall not be responsible for losses resulting from the Client's installation and use of the computer programs used in relation to the Trading Platform, unless such liability follows from mandatory applicable law.
…
41 RISK DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR TRADES IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVES (INCLUDING CFD´S, FUTURES AND OPTION
This brief statement, which constitutes an addition to these Terms, does not disclose all of the risks and other significant aspects of trading foreign exchange and derivatives. In consideration of the risks, you should enter into transactions with the mentioned products only if you understand the nature of the contracts and the contractual legal relationship into which you are entering and the extent of your exposure to risk. Transactions in foreign exchange and derivatives are not suitable for many members of the public. You should carefully consider whether transacting is appropriate for you in light of your experience, objectives, financial resources and other relevant circumstances.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVES
1. Effect of "Leverage" or "Gearing"
Transactions in foreign exchange and derivatives carry a high degree of risk. The amount of initial margin may be small relative to the value of the foreign exchange or derivatives contract so that transactions are "leveraged" or "geared". A relatively small market movement will have a proportionately larger impact on the funds you have deposited or will have to deposit; this may work against you as well as for you. You may sustain a total loss of initial margin funds and any additional funds deposited with Saxo Bank to maintain your position. If the market moves against your position and/or Margin Requirement is increased, you may be called upon to deposit additional funds on short notice to maintain your position. Failing to comply with a request for a deposit of additional funds, may result in closure of your position(s) by Saxo Bank on your behalf and you will be liable for any resulting loss or deficit.
…
ADDITIONAL RISKS COMMON TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS
…
5. Suspension or Restriction of Trading and Pricing Relationships
Market condition (e.g. illiquidity) and/or the operation of the rules of certain markets (e.g., the suspension of trading in any contract or contract month because of price limits or "circuit breakers") may increase the risk of loss by making it difficult or impossible to effect transactions or close/ offset positions. If you have sold options, this may increase the risk of loss.
Normal pricing relationships between the underlying asset and a derivative do not always exist. The absence of an underlying reference price may make it difficult to judge "fair" value. …”
Banken har oplyst, at bankens hjemmeside indeholder følgende under produktet future:
”Futures risk warning
A future is categorised as a red product as it is considered an investment product with a high complexity and a high risk … “
Klageren har henvist til, at følgende fremgår af bankens Ordreudførelsespolitik (Order Execution Policy):
”… 2.1.1. When dealing with clients, Saxo Bank has a general duty to act honestly, fairly, professionally and in the best interest of the client. In relation to order execution, Saxo Bank is required to take all sufficient steps to obtain the best possible result when executing client orders or when placing orders with, or transmitting orders to, other entities to execute. …
…
Schedule 8 …
2.1. Saxo Bank does not support physical delivery of the underlying security on expiry of any future. Therefore, Saxo Bank advises clients to take note of the expiry and first notice dates (FND) of any futures in which they have positions and ensure they are closed before the appropriate day, as described below.”
Parternes påstande
Den 15. maj 2020 har klageren indbragt sagen for Ankenævnet med påstand om, at Saxo Bank skal erstatte hans tab på CLK0 samt hans omkostninger til juridisk bistand med tillæg af procesrenter.
Saxo Bank har nedlagt påstand om frifindelse.
Parternes argumenter
Klageren har bl.a. anført, at han blev påført et tab som følge af bankens fejl og forsømmelser.
De Almindelige forretningsbetingelser fra 2018 er ikke gældende for ham. Han blev kunde før oktober 2019 og tiltrådte de daværende Almindelige forretningsbetingelser. Han har ikke fået meddelelse om, at Almindelige forretningsbetingelser var ændret.
Banken kan ikke blot afvise kravet med generelle henvisninger til sine forretningsbetingelser, der ikke er gældende og endvidere ikke relevante for sagen. Banken har ikke forholdt sig til hans anbringender, men gentager blot nogle generelle påstande.
Han forsøgte forgæves at begrænse sit tab ved at logge ind på bankens system for at lukke sine positioner. Dette var ikke muligt på grund af fejl i bankens system, handelsplatformen og/eller bankens server. De af banken fremlagte logs viser ikke, hvordan status for log ind så ud på hans skærm. Da han var logget ind kl. 18:52 forsøgte han mange gange forgæves at lukke sine CLK0. Bankens system fejlede gennem flere timer. Begivenheden fandt sted over et forløb på otte til ti timer. Banken kan ikke blot afvise kravet med henvisning til, at de negative priser på CLK0 var en usædvanlig hændelse. Den fremlagte udskrift af telefonsamtalen med banken den 20. april 2020 viser klart, at der var fejl hos banken. Han forsøgte forgæves at begrænse sit tab ved at kontakte bankens handelsbord og kundeservice, som ikke svarede. Han forsøgte at komme i kontakt med banken mange gange ud over de gange, som banken har oplyst. Alle hans forsøg på at begrænse tabet var forgæves. Hans beskrivelse af forløbet er dokumenteret gennem den fremlagte korrespondance med hans øjeblikkelige henvendelser til banken og gennem anden fremlagt dokumentation.
Banken forsømte at yde ham den fornødne beskyttelse. Det følger af MiFID II artikel 16, stk. 3 og 4, at et investeringsselskab inden for rimelighedens grænser skal træffe sådanne foranstaltninger, som måtte være nødvendige for at sikre kontinuitet og regelmæssighed i ydelsen af investeringsservice og udførelsen af investeringsaktiviteter. Investeringsselskabet skal med henblik herpå anvende hensigtsmæssige og forholdsmæssigt afpassede systemer, ressourcer og procedurer. Det følger endvidere, at et investeringsselskab regelmæssigt skal gennemgå de finansielle instrumenter, som det tilbyder eller markedsfører, under hensyntagen til forhold, der væsentligt kan påvirke den potentielle risiko for den afgrænsede målgruppe, med henblik på som minimum at vurdere, om det finansielle instrument fortsat opfylder den afgrænsede målgruppes behov, og om den tilsigtede distributionsstrategi fortsat er hensigtsmæssig.
Det følger af MiFID II artikel 24, stk. 1 og 2, at et investeringsselskab skal handle i sine kunders bedste interesse, og at et investeringsselskab skal forstå de finansielle instrumenter, selskabet tilbyder eller anbefaler, vurdere de finansielle instrumenters opfyldelse af behovene hos de kunder, selskabet yder investeringsservice, bl.a. under hensyntagen til den afgrænsede målgruppe af slutkunder som omhandlet i artikel 16, stk. 3, og sikre, at der kun tilbydes eller anbefales finansielle instrumenter, når dette er i kundens interesse.
Banken har ikke opfyldt og har ikke dokumenteret at have opfyldt sine forpligtelser efter MiFID II, herunder artikel 16 og artikel 24, efter bankens egen politik for ordreudførelse, herunder art. 2.1.1 og schedule 8, artikel 2.1, og oplysninger på bankens hjemmeside, hvorefter banken ”must take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible results for clients when executing orders or when placing orders with, or transmitting to, a third party”. Banken har forsømt at yde en 24/5 kundeservice som angivet på bankens hjemmeside.
Banken gav ham ikke de fornødne risikoadvarsler. Den af banken påberåbte ”risk warning” var ikke en advarsel om, at positionerne kunne blive negative. På tidspunktet for e-mailen var prisen på CLK0 lige under 20 USD. Der var tale om en generel e-mail til bankens kunder. Mailen var snarere investeringsrådgivning og ikke en advarsel til beskyttelse af kunderne.
Banken har udøvet forskelsbehandling af sine kunder efter omfanget af kundernes engagement i strid med investorbeskyttelsesreglerne fra ESMA og Finanstilsynet. Han er bekendt med andre kunder i banken, der efter drøftelse med deres rådgiver i banken kunne lukke deres positioner i tide.
Banken forsømte at lukke hans position rettidigt, da marginkravet ikke var opfyldt. Banken begik en fejl ved at lade tabet stige til 32.750 USD. Det fremgår af det fremlagte bilag af den tilsvarende WTI future CLQ0, at margin kald gives ved 90 %.
Banken tilbageførte ulovligt beløbet på 20.000 EUR og brugte det til modregning i tabet vedrørende CLK0. De fremlagte udskrifter, herunder de af banken fremlagte, viser, at han havde udfyldt de fornødne oplysninger, BIC og SWIFT koder, og at overførslen blev gennemført. Oplysningerne var gemt i systemet og blev anvendt til flere overførsler. Bankens påstande og oplysninger vedrørende overførslen er falske.
Han anmodede allerede i april 2020 banken om at udlevere samtlige lydoptagelser af telefonsamtaler og anden dokumentation vedrørende hans kommunikation med banken. Banken efterkom ikke hans anmodninger og sendte kun uddrag, som banken selv havde udvalgt. Da han endelig modtog enkelte dele af det efterspurgte materiale, indeholdt materialet optagelser af bankens samtaler med andre kunder i banken. Bankens uautoriserede videregivelse af personoplysninger om tredjemand er i strid med GDPR-reglerne.
Banken videresendte endvidere personoplysninger om ham til Indien, der ikke er omfatter af GDPR-reglerne. Dette var også i strid med GDPR-reglerne og medfører ugyldighed i forhold til registrering af hans kundeforhold og åbning af hans konto i banken. Overtrædelserne viser, at banken ikke handler professionelt og lovligt.
Saxo Bank har anført, at en bank kun undtagelsesvist er erstatningsansvarlig for investorers tab på risikable og spekulative investeringer. Klagerens erstatningskrav forudsætter, at klageren godtgør, at banken handlede groft uagtsomt, og at klageren som følge af en sådan grov uagtsomhed har lidt et påregneligt og kausalt økonomisk tab, som han ikke selv bærer ansvaret for.
Klageren har ikke og kan ikke løfte denne bevisbyrde. Det må i den forbindelse tages i betragtning, at klageren har en professionel baggrund, har indsigt i det finansielle marked og en omfattede erfaring med investeringer, og at klageren selv anmodede om at blive behandlet som en professionel kunde.
Der er intet grundlag for at anføre, at banken begik fejl eller forsømmelser vedrørende klagerens investeringer i CLK0. Klageren har anført, at han ikke kunne logge på handelsplatformen. Der var intet galt i bankens system, som hindrede klageren i at logge på. Det er ikke korrekt, at klageren forgæves forsøgte at logge på. Ingen af klagerens log ind forsøg blev afvist. Det fremgår af de fremlagte logs, at klageren loggede af og på adskillige gange den 20. april 2020. Klageren loggede på kl. 17:51 GMT, loggede kl. 17:58 GMT og loggede atter på kl. 18:52 GMT. Klageren var således ikke logget på, da CLK0 blev negativ kl. 18:08.
Det fremgår endvidere, at klageren, da han loggede på kl. 18:52, åbnede en række vinduer, men at han ikke forsøgte at lukke positionen. Banken har ikke undladt at udføre ordrer fra klageren. Klageren forsøgte ikke at reducere sine positioner. Eventuelle forsøg herpå ville være blevet registreret på aktivitetsloggen som ”order failed”. Der er ikke registreret forsøg herpå. Klageren er ansvarlig for sin egen adgang og it-forbindelse. Tabet er en følge af klagerens egen beslutning om at investere.
Da klageren ringede til banken, ventede han ikke, indtil han kom igennem. Bankens kundeservice var åben, men banken er ikke ansvarlig for, at klageren ikke ventede, indtil han kom igennem.
Klagerens tab udgør markedsværdien af CLK0 på tidspunktet for lukning. Der er højst tale om en skuffede forventninger, som ikke kan begrunde et erstatningskrav efter dansk ret.
Klageren har fremsat en række udokumenterede påstande om, at banken ikke overholder MiFID, ikke foretog tilstrækkelige foranstaltninger og ikke ydede klageren den fornødne service. Klagerens påstande er udokumenterede. Banken har givet klageren den nødvendige risikoinformation og har opfyldt sine forpligtelser efter MiFID II. Risikoen ved stærkt spekulative investeringer er fremhævet flere steder i bankens Almindelige forretningsbetingelser, herunder at kunden risikerer at tabe et større beløb end det investerede. Banken opfylder reglerne i MiFID. Banken er under tilsyn af Finanstilsynet.
Klageren blev ”stopped out”, da han ikke havde tiltrækkelig margin. Ankenævnet har i flere afgørelser fastslået, at bankens Almindelige forretningsbetingelser indeholder de fornødne oplysninger om risici, og at banken er berettiget til at tvangslukke kundens positioner, hvis kunden ikke opfylder marginkravene. Banken garanterer ikke, at der sker tvangslukning ved 100 % marginudnyttelse, og det fremgår klart af Almindelige forretningsbetingelser, at banken fastsætter marginkravene jf. Almindelige forretningsbetingelser pkt. 26.1.
Klagerens overførsel på 20.000 EUR blev tilbageført og står fortsat på klagerens konto i banken. Banken var berettiget til at modregne i ethvert indestående, som klageren har hos banken, for klagerens gæld til banken, uanset om klageren havde forsøgt at hæve disse beløb. Banken havde således ret til at modregne i beløbet på 20.000 EUR, men klageren solgte selv FAZ:arcx aktier til dækning af sin negative balance, så banken foretog ikke modregning i beløbet på 20.000 EUR. Klagerens påstand om, at banken skulle have fremagt en ”falsk” kontoopgørelse afvises.
Banken har fulgt reglerne i GDPR og har truffet fornødne foranstaltninger, herunder for sine datterselskaber og filialer i Indien, der følger de europæiske regler.
Ankenævnets bemærkninger
Efter det i sagen fremlagte må det lægges til grund, at klageren tiltrådte, at bankens daværende Almindelige forretningsbetingelser af januar 2018 var gældende for hans kundeforhold, da han i oktober 2019 på ny blev kunde i Saxo Bank.
Den 19. marts 2020 anmodede klageren om at blive klassificeret som professionel kunde. Den 16. april 2020 blev klageren klassificeret som professionel kunde.
Den 20. april 2020 kl. 14:38 GMT købte klageren NYMEX WTI Crude Oil May 2020 Futures kontrakter (CLK0). Den 20. april 2020 omkring kl. 18:08 GMT blev prisen på CLK0 negativ. Den 20. april 2020 kl. 19:57 GMT blev klagerens position i CLK0 tvangslukket af banken. Klageren har oplyst, at hans tab på CLK0 var 32.750 USD.
Klageren har navnlig anført, at han forgæves forsøgte at begrænse sit tab ved at logge ind på bankens system for at lukke sine positioner, men at dette ikke var muligt på grund af fejl i bankens system. Han forsøgte mange gange forgæves at logge på. Da han var logget ind, forsøgte han mange gange forgæves at lukke sine CLK0 positioner.
Klageren har endvidere anført, at banken forsømte at yde ham den fornødne beskyttelse, og at det ikke var muligt at komme i kontakt med banken pr. telefon eller på anden vis.
Banken har anført, at ingen af klagerens log ind forsøg blev afvist, og at klageren, da han var logget på kl. 18:52 GMT, ikke forsøgte at lukke sine CLK0 positioner. Banken har fremlagt en aktivitetslog for klageren og har oplyst, at det fremgår heraf, at klageren ikke forsøgte at reducere sin eksponering i CLK0.
Ankenævnet finder ikke grundlag for at fastslå, at klageren den 20 april 2020 ikke kunne logge ind som følge af fejl i bankens system. Ankenævnet finder det ikke godtgjort, at klageren forsøgte at reducere sin eksponering i CLK0.
Banken var i henhold til sine Almindelige forretningsbetingelser artikel 26 berettiget til at tvangslukke klagerens positioner, da hans sikkerhedsstillelse ikke var tilstrækkelig til at dække marginkravet. Ankenævnet finder ikke, at banken havde påtaget sig en forpligtelse til at gennemføre tvangslukningen ved 100 % marginudnyttelse.
Ankenævnet finder herefter ikke grundlag for at fastslå, at banken begik fejl eller forsømmelser i forbindelse med håndteringen og tvangslukningen af klagerens investering i CLK0.
Ankenævnet finder ikke, at der i øvrigt er oplyst omstændigheder, der kan begrunde, at banken skal pålægges at betale et beløb til klageren.
Klagerne får herefter ikke medhold i klagen.
Ankenævnets afgørelse
Klageren får ikke medhold i klagen.