Indsigelse mod at hæfte for netbankoverførsler foretaget med henblik på investering. Recovery scam.
| Sagsnummer: | 347/2023 |
| Dato: | 06-02-2024 |
| Ankenævn: | Helle Korsgaard Lund-Andersen, Jonas Thestrup Nielsen, Mette Lindekvist Højsgaard, Tina Thygesen og Elizabeth Bonde. |
| Klageemne: |
Betalingstjenester - ubegrænset hæftelse
Netbank - øvrige spørgsmål |
| Ledetekst: | Indsigelse mod at hæfte for netbankoverførsler foretaget med henblik på investering. Recovery scam. |
| Indklagede: | Spar Nord Bank |
| Øvrige oplysninger: | |
| Senere dom: | |
| Pengeinstitutter |
Indledning
Sagen vedrører indsigelse mod at hæfte for netbankoverførsler foretaget med henblik på investering. Recovery scam.
Sagens omstændigheder
Klageren var kunde i Spar Nord Bank, hvor han havde en konto med netbankadgang.
I perioden fra den 30. september 2022 til den 27. januar 2023 foretog klageren netbankoverførsler for i alt 83.506,10 EUR, svarende til ca. 623.000 DKK, til konti i udenlandske pengeinstitutter, R og B.
Ved ni af netbankoverførslerne til konti i R blev klageren angivet som både ordregivende kunde og modtagende kunde, og under betalingsbetingelserne blev angivet ”FERIE OPS”, herunder ved de tre øvrige betalinger til B.
Banken har oplyst, at det på baggrund af ovenstående ser ud til, at overførslerne er sket til klagerens egne konti i R, og at den ikke kan afgøre, hvorvidt det samme gør sig gældende vedrørende de tre overførsler til B.
Banken har fremlagt transaktionsbilag.
Klageren har oplyst, at han blev udsat for investeringssvindel foretaget af G, og at der blev overført 262.167,60 DKK fra hans konto i banken ved brug af deres services.
Banken har oplyst, at overførslerne delvist blev finansieret ved lånoptagelse i RB på 300.000 DKK i januar 2023.
Banken har oplyst, at der ikke skete overførsler til G.
Banken har endvidere oplyst, at de mange og i forhold til klageren usædvanlige transaktioner i starten af 2023 gav anledning til, at klageren i forlængelse af en alarm i bankens hvidvaskssystem blev spurgt til transaktionerne, og at klageren forklarede at der var tale om et lån og opsparing til ferie. Adspurgt om klagerens egen tekst på de interne kontooverførsler ”køb af bitcoin” bestred klageren, at dette var tilfældet.
Klageren gjorde den 20. april 2023 indsigelse over for banken i et engelsksproget brev. Af brevet fremgik blandt andet:
”Commencing on or about September 30, 2022, I fell victim to a multilayered scam operation orchestrated by “[G]” (the “Company” or the “Fraudster”), with the design, development, manufacturing, promoting, marketing, distributing, labeling, and/or sale of illegal and outright fraudulent “investment services,” all of which aim at contributing to the goal of robbing and defrauding clients through a predetermined cycle of the client losses to gains. Money was transferred from my Spar Nord Bank account in the total amount of 262,167.60 DKK utilizing your services.
…
MERCHANT’S FRAUD SCHEME — ALLEGATIONS
The Company hired, managed, and trained personnel, and collaborated with others as accomplices to their crimes to induce fraud that resulted in my financial and psychological damages. These include, but are not limited to, the following allegations, all of which involve criminal, non-regulated, and malicious activities:
1. The Company directed and instructed others to work from shell companies that were operating from various unassociated locations across the globe.
2. The Company opened bank accounts in multiple countries and used them through their accomplices and strawmen from around the world to conceal and disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources.
3. The Company intentionally committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and falsified its agent names, credentials, competencies, qualifications and location. The Company’s name is merely a brand name, officially owned by shell corporations located offshore. In reality, the entire operation is being conducted from elsewhere (supposed location is evidently fictitious), and on top of that the call center, marketing, and decision making, are all being performed by completely anonymous and hidden entities. Concealing true identities and utilizing front companies as a vehicle for a wide spectrum of financial maneuvers is a notorious practice of criminal organizations.
4. The Company has blatantly violated international laws, as it has been practicing without a license and funneling enormous sums of money, through countries and jurisdictions that require registration to operate.
5. The Company provided direct investment advice - not utilizing 3rd party recommendations (e.g., “according to Bloomberg TV/Investing.com”)
6. The Company offered investment services/advice not related to real market/exchange data (manufacturing false charts etc.). The trading platform was purposely manipulated, in a way that each client would ineluctably and unknowingly lose money, as the trades were simply concocted. Instead, the Company’s staff and its accomplices simply pocketed the money, using it to purchase various luxurious, non-essential items.
7. The Company prohibited my ability to withdraw my funds.
8. The Company was guaranteeing returns/yields (unrealistic ones).
9. The Company furnished me with bonuses - which are not allowed to be given.
10. My money was not held in a segregated account.
11. The Company did not advertise/disclose/was not transparent regarding the statistical data representing the percentage of total client losses at the company.
12. The Company did not mention the commission and overnight swaps.
13. The Company did not read the risk disclosure prior to my deposit(s).
14. The Company used high pressure tactics and outbursts, which took a severe toll on my health.
15. Armed with my personal details, the Company’s staff seduced me into transferring all of my savings to them. They utilized their knowledge of my cultural context, which stressed square and honorable business dealings along with honesty, in order to maliciously take advantage of my trusting nature.
Please take notice that my funds were transferred through means of coercion and under false pretenses.
Attached, please find supportive statements, screenshots, and further evidence.
EXPOSING YOUR ORGANIZATION’S MISCONDUCT
I hereby allege that your organization has completely failed to adequately investigate the circumstances surrounding the transactions in question and willfully blinded itself to obvious red flags.
Many suspicions should have arisen at your organization as an issue of great concern, with respect to the unusual activity taking place in my account. Despite the regulatory and statutory requirements your organization should abide by as a licensed and regulated financial institution — and instead of detecting patterns, drawing certain conclusions, and taking actions accordingly— you at best, merely and insufficiently performed some hasty and haphazard reviews of the transactions or possibly asked only minimal generic questions regarding the suspicious activities, and at worst, shut your eyes completely rather than being careful, methodical, and vigilant. Had you bothered, you would probably have realized that the funds were associated with fraud and financial crime, rather than some other legitimate revenue/activity.
In light of the above, and after conducting a comprehensive review of our communication/interactions, it has become glaringly obvious to me that no adequate information and/or documentation were sought by your organization, at best, and at worst —no appropriate safeguards were implemented.
If a financial institution executes a customer order to transfer money knowing it to be “dishonestly given, shutting its eyes to the obvious fact of the dishonesty, or acting recklessly in failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable individual would undergo”, it would be in breach of its duty of care, even if the payment was made in accordance with the terms of the mandate, and the financial institution should still be liable for negligence resulting in damages.
Compliance departments should ensure that staff members understand the legal requirements and where there are suspicions, these suspicions be communicated to all relevant personnel whilst being investigated.
For the avoidance of doubt, reasonable grounds should not necessarily be interpreted as proof. On the basis of various signs, you should have assumed that something suspicious was going on therefore should have suspended transactions until reasonable enquiries could be made to verify that the transactions were properly executed. In other words, I am a victim of your negligence for facilitating the misappropriation of funds, and doing little to safeguard public financial interests. Any reasonable staff member would have realized that there were many obvious, even glaring, signs that I was being defrauded. (Singulars Holdings Limited (in liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [2019] UKSC 50) [ii]
You knew or should have known that the funds being transferred through your services did not rightfully belong to the recipient fraudsters. Similarly, you knew or should have known that the funds being transferred through your services serve no legitimate or lawful purpose. You turned a blind eye to the crimes that you have facilitated and thus provided an array of essential money transfer services, acting as a vehicle, with the awareness that it was enabling the fraudsters to commit crimes and enrich themselves with the funds of their victims.
Your services undoubtedly served as a crucial element in the fraudulent scheme detailed herein, and you were either unaware of your complicity in the fraud, or, more worryingly, completely aware and silent. Had you conducted an adequate account analysis, you would have discovered the nature of the recipient, and subsequently, disclosed and reported the fraudsters’ activities to law enforcement authorities/agencies and regulators. Instead, to satisfy your financial interests, you conveniently closed your eyes, even though you undeniably had, at all material times, the necessary controls and resources to influence, whether directly or indirectly, those particular transactions.
You also had the duty to stop those crimes, yet you refused to do so because you were more interested in enriching yourself, even if it meant furthering those crimes and allowing them to cause massive financial losses to plenty of victims — many of whom are probably your customers. Therefore, it is clear that you did not have in place adequate security measures to properly safeguard my assets — hence, you have irreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably harm other victims as well as their loved ones and associates. You have irreparably harmed me and, if not enjoined, will continue to irreparably harm the general public, and our society deserves better.
“A financial institution which wrongly pays money away when it has no authority to do so will usually be treated as if it had paid using its own funds, not those of its customer.”
When discussing the responsibilities that a financial institution might incur, it is crucial not to forget the fact that a legitimate complaint by, or cause of action on the part of, a client might generate/give rise to further statutory cause of action and/or additional liabilities beholden by a financial institution to the relevant regulatory authority. Obligations/duties beholden by a financial institution to a regulator are distinct from those beholden to the customer. Moreover, you may be held liable to more than one regulator.
As a regulated and licensed financial institution, you have strict statutory and regulatory obligations to monitor transactions and report any suspicious activities to law enforcement authorities. The importance of implementing robust internal systems to detect and report money laundering and other suspicious activities has been continuously emphasized in the industry in addition to having the appropriate policies, procedures and internal controls in place to ensure ongoing compliance in respect to the aforementioned systems. You should have analysed and distinguished thereafter between that which may be normal activity and that which could suggest an illegal activity. This is a well-known standard industry practice which plays a substantial role in preventing criminals from liquidating and laundering funds.”
Banken afviste klagerens krav under henvisning til, at han selv havde foretaget overførslerne.
Parternes påstande
Den 16. juni 2023 har klageren indbragt sagen for Ankenævnet med påstand om, at Spar Nord Bank skal give ham en kompensation.
Spar Nord Bank har nedlagt påstand om frifindelse.
Parternes argumenter
Klageren har anført, at han samarbejdede med G om investering, og at en af deres ansatte, som forvaltede hans investeringer, guidede ham til og foretog aktiviteterne i forbindelse med optagelse af et lån, således at han kunne blive en del af en investeringscirkel med et garanteret afkast, og som oplyste ham om, at de ville returnere de lånte penge inden for 3-4 dage. Dette skete ikke, og de forsvandt.
Bankens adfærd var ikke i overensstemmelse med dens juridiske rolle og ansvar over for dens kunder. Banken sælger en service, hvorefter den skal passe på sine kunder og deres penge.
Kommunikationen med banken har været dårlig.
Banken burde have reageret på mistænkelige overførsler og informeret ham.
Banken overholdt ikke Payment Services Directive (II) (EU) 2015/2366.
Spar Nord Bank har anført, at der er tale om transaktioner, som klageren selv har gennemført i sin netbank. Der er ikke tale om uautoriserede betalinger, og forholdet er ikke omfattet af betalingslovens § 100.
Der er ikke noget grundlag for, at banken skulle være forpligtet til at godtgøre klageren noget beløb.
Da banken på baggrund af transaktionerne kontaktede klageren, gav han en forklaring, der i lyset af nærværende klage har været løgnagtig.
Det er bankens opfattelse, at klageren er udsat for et ”recovery scam” og sandsynligvis franarres yderligere midler i forbindelse med den ”hjælp”, han har modtaget til klagen.
Klagerens bemærkninger er efter bankens opfattelse en standardskrivelse fra de personer, der er i gang med et ”recovery scam” over for klageren. Indholdet har intet med sagens fakta at gøre.
Ankenævnets bemærkninger
Klageren var kunde i Spar Nord Bank, hvor han havde en konto og netbankadgang.
I perioden fra den 30. september 2022 til den 27. januar 2023 foretog klageren net-bankoverførsler for i alt 83.506,10 EUR, svarende til ca. 623.000 DKK, til konti i udenlandske pengeinstitutter, R og B.
Ved ni af netbankoverførslerne til konti i R blev klageren angivet som både ordregi-vende kunde og modtagende kunde, og under betalingsbetingelserne blev angivet ”FERIE OPS”, herunder ved de tre øvrige betalinger til B.
Banken har oplyst, at det på baggrund af ovenstående ser ud til, at overførslerne er sket til klagerens egne konti i R, og at den ikke kan afgøre, hvorvidt det samme gør sig gældende vedrørende de tre overførsler til B.
Klageren har oplyst, at han overførte pengene med henblik på investering.
Ankenævnet lægger til grund, at de ni overførsler til konti i R, er overførsler foretaget af klageren til klagerens egne konti i R.
Ankenævnet lægger videre til grund, at samtlige af de i sagen omhandlede netbankoverførsler skete med klagerens medvirken og samtykke. Betalingslovens § 100 om uautoriserede betalinger finder derfor ikke anvendelse.
Betalingslovens § 112 vedrører betalingstransaktioner i forbindelse med køb af varer og tjenesteydelser, som er iværksat ved brug af et betalingsinstrument. Ankenævnet finder ikke, at bestemmelsen finder anvendelse på de i sagen omhandlede transaktioner, der blev gennemført som kontooverførsler i klagerens netbank.
Ankenævnet finder ikke, at der er oplyst omstændigheder, der kan medføre, at banken på andet grundlag er forpligtet til at godtgøre klageren det påståede beløb.
Klageren får herefter ikke medhold i klagen.
Ankenævnets afgørelse
Klageren får ikke medhold i klagen.